My opinion is that ISR is the most likely type of malicious UAV operation and kinetic the least, probably by an order of magnitude. Bear with me while I cover some familiar ground before talking about the most interesting threat – SIGINT. To start, let us all acknowledge that there…
Does the counter UAS system you bought work? Does it actually solve your problem?
What If … DJI Replaces Their DroneID with RemoteID? Supporting RemoteID offers DJI a simple off ramp from the thorny issue of AeroScopes being used in combat zones or for unintended use cases.
RemoteID is scheduled to start rolling out in September of this year in the U.S. In very simple terms, RemoteID require almost all drones to broadcast their location in real time and, with appropriate access, provide additional metadata about the drone and its operator.
In the non-DOD environment we use the term “CUAS” without any modifiers to talk about everything from airspace awareness to UAVs in Ukraine. This leads to inefficiencies and confusion when trying to discuss capabilities, pricing, use cases, and threat models.
The Global Drone Security Network (GDSN) is the only event of its kind focusing on Cyber-UAV security, Drone Threat Intelligence, Counter-UAS, and UTM security.
Excel – it just does not scale. For years I’ve watched investigators work with large datasets using Excel, and have done so myself.
n the simplest terms we need to compare apples to apples. To accurately compare data from different sources that all relate to a common event – a UAS flight in this case – we must use common frames of reference. Before we dig into examples, let’s cover what is involved…
GIGO – Garbage In, Garbage Out. – If your raw data is flawed there is little hope for meaningful analysis.
During the data analysis phase of a CUAS T&E event questions such as these often arise:
